Tune Stuck in the Head

John Mowitt

Is not the involuntary recollection, Proust’s mémoire involontaire, much closer to forgetting than what is usually called memory? And is not this work of spontaneous recollection, in which remembrance is the woof and forgetting the warp, a counterpart to Penelope’s work rather than its likeness? For here the day unravels what the night has woven.

Walter Benjamin

Sound Politics

Few progressive commentators on the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have overlooked their troubling ironies. On November 17, 2001 Laura Bush preempted her husband, George II, by delivering his weekly radio address. Her topic: the link between terror and Islamic fundamentalism especially as the latter manifested itself in the Taliban’s treatment of women and children in Afghanistan. As she put it, ‘[T]he fight against terrorism is also a fight for the rights and dignity of women.’ Meanwhile, back at the ranch, her husband’s administration was busily preparing to criminalize so-called partial birth abortions (widely considered to be a first step toward rescinding Roe vs. Wade), and install W. David Hager as head of the Federal Drug Administration’s Commission on Reproductive Health. Dr. Hager is an outspoken, anti-choice physician who actively promotes faith healing.

Following suit George II (and let us not forget the “coalition of the willing”) invaded first Afghanistan and then Iraq in the name of freeing the peoples of these countries from tyranny, extending his wife’s chain of reasoning so as finally to contrast terror with democracy. The invinduous character of this contrast was perhaps first articulated by Guy Debord when he wrote that ‘[s]uch a perfect democracy constructs its perfect foe, terrorism. Its wish is to be judged by its enemies not by its results’. This wish could never be more fervent than when the result sought by democracy is its own negation, a state of affairs brilliantly diagnosed by Slavoj Žižek in his commentary on the war in Iraq for the US weekly, In These Times. There, with his characteristic counter-intuitive brio, Žižek aligned himself against those decrying the hypocrisy of the quest for weapons of mass destruction, or those insisting that ‘its all about oil’, arguing instead that ‘the true target of the “war on terror”’ is American society itself – the disciplining of its emancipatory excesses. Adjusting for his presumptuous conflation of the US
with democracy, what becomes manifest in Žižek's formulation is precisely the state of affairs decried by Debord.

If it is important to begin by reciting these disturbing banalities, it is not because of the moral 'high road' an exposure of their essential hypocrisy might pave. Instead, what must be stressed about the current incarnation of the democratic attack on democracy is its popularity, at least in the US, where – if we are to believe the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance document – this attack was conceived. Even those in politics willing to challenge the Bush/Cheney/Rumsfeld/Wolfowitz agenda, do so largely on economic grounds, as though dismantling democracy were not quite as calamitous as the health of the stock market, the unemployment rate or the price of petroleum. Although such remarks obviously call out for a more serious discussion of the distinctively American form of the de-politicization of politics, this will have to wait. In the meantime, let us turn our attention to a matter that any thorough account of the de-politicization of politics would at some point have to confront, namely, the problem of accounting for the social production of critical consciousness, and, presumably, its cessation. The urgency of this problem derives from the fact that, in one way or another, it offers to account for precisely those experiences that are politicizable, a point which concedes, indeed insists, that to the extent that experience itself is mediated, there is no experience that is immediately political. Much less progressively so. Thus, reflection on the production of critical consciousness points us, in general, toward the social practices and institutions that organize, indeed position, political subjects. Indeed, it does so with sufficient generality that the specifically US variant of the de-politicization of politics (and the democratic assault on democracy) need not be radically distinguished from other variants, especially with 'Americanization' (aka 'globalization') now well underway.

Whether or not one, like Sartre, regards Marxism as the West's 'unsurpassable horizon', it is clear that Marx's account of 'proletarianization', that is, the process whereby the working class comes to identify with its structurally delimited consciousness, has survived, in theory if nowhere else, the crisis of the 'really existing socialisms'. And while Althusser may have over-emphasized the break separating the Grundrisse (or at least the 1857 introduction) and Capital from the 'young' Marx, he was certainly right to insist on the structural logic of the analysis in Capital I, where what whistles through every gothic sentence is a draft of what will cause – almost regardless of the disposition of the class struggle – capitalism to dig its own grave and jump in. Thus, when Marx describes proletarianization in terms of the social convergence between the sustained expropriation of surplus value, and the industrialized collectivization of those from whom it is expropriated, he is articulating the structural conditions for the social production of critical consciousness. Specifically, it is not enough that theft take place, this theft must occur at precisely the point where fetishism is weakened through inversion (where social relations are lived in commodity production), and in a context where collective discussion is impossible to contain. It is in this sense that working class experience becomes politicizable. For reasons that will become clearer in a moment, this process – due in no small part to its specifically structural character—is involuntary. It does not take place as result of a decision to bring it about.

'When Marx undertook his analysis of the capitalist mode of production, this mode was in its infancy'. This, the opening sentence of Benjamin's, 'The Work of Art in the Age
of Its Technical Reproducibility', at once preempts all subsequent discussion of so-called post-industrial society, and underscores his ambivalent relation to Marxism, an ambivalence that culminated, in the years immediately prior to his suicide, in a theory of history where the dwarf of dialectical materialism was borne on the shoulders of the Jewish Messiah. Benjamin’s sentence, underscoring as it does the break before and after language (Anfang from infans), not only foreshadows the necessity of a historical supplementation of Marxism, it confronts us with the task of tracking what happens to Marxism in the course of its properly Messianic supplementation. In particular, what happens to the production of critical consciousness once the mode of production passes from, as it were, the silent era?

It is not difficult to show that much of Benjamin’s writing during the thirties traces the impact of commodification on the cultural field. In the ‘Art Work’ essay this takes the form of showing how, in a certain sense, the structural logic of proletarianization has spread from the field of production to the field of consumption, indeed, to the consumption of culture. How else are we to understand the confidence with which Benjamin, in his notes for the essay, aligns the shock experience of spectatorship with the worker’s shake down at the assembly line? As odd as it may seem, when, at the essay’s close Benjamin calls for the politicization of art, he is doing so on the basis of his belief in the broadly cultural politicization of the masses. The point is not, as the obtuse have uncharitably asserted, that watching a film either politicizes one, or triggers revolt. Rather, Benjamin is insisting that as the capitalist mode of production came of age (after it became possible to imagine commodities speaking, as Marx does in Capital I), it began to redistribute the structural occasions for the production of critical consciousness. As one might assume, this did not leave the redistributed elements untouched. Indeed, Benjamin proposes a new dyad of proletarianization. In the place of a palpable encounter with the expropriation of surplus value and collectivized association, he stresses the masses’ desire to get closer to things, and to overcome their uniqueness; both critical re-articulations of commodity fetishism. But here’s the question: how precisely is this displaced structure of proletarianization secured at the level of the subject positions constituting the masses?

Although the ‘Art Work’ essay appeals to the concept of the optical unconsciousness and its structurally critical character, better resources for responding to such a question appear in contemporaneous essays, indeed ones often regarded as at odds with the ‘utopian’ aspirations of the ‘Art Work’ essay. Perhaps the most pertinent of these is the well-known, ‘On Some Motifs in Baudelaire’, where through a formulation cited from Beyond the Pleasure Principle, to wit ‘emerging consciousness takes the place of a memory trace’, Benjamin not only thematizes the crucial link between memory and the production of consciousness, but he forever complicates all political deployments of memory. This last is achieved by recovering and elaborating Proust’s distinction, drawn in the ‘overture’ to Swann’s Way, between voluntary and involuntary memory. As my epigraphic evocation of ‘On the Image of Proust’ makes clear, this distinction had mattered to Benjamin for some time, certainly for more than a decade. And, it is one, interestingly, whose provenance Benjamin and Julia Kristeva disagree about, the former proposing that it derives from Bergson’s Matter and Memory, the latter tracing it to Schopenhauer as mediated through the teachings of Gabriel Séeilès, an aesthetician.
whose seminar, ‘Studies in Sensibility’, Proust followed in 1894-95. Although the
matter of its derivation is not uninteresting, clearly more important is the way
Benjamin interprets Proust’s distinction.

As with so many of Benjamin’s conceptual touchstones the distinction between
voluntary and involuntary memory resists summary. This is due, in large part, to the
fact that so many of Benjamin’s touchstones are piled, as it were, on each other. So, in
order to exhaust the memory problem, one would have to take up the related
distinction between the novel and the story, and the two modalities of experience, 
Erlebnis (or immediate, short term experience) and Erfahrung (or enduring, long term
experience). Needless to say, this is not the place to attempt such an exhaustive survey.
Thus, let us make the best of a difficult situation and settle for a consideration of the
fundamental difference between the two Proustian memories. If Benjamin appeals here
to psychoanalysis it is because Freud provides him with the concept of the unconscious,
and, as it turns out, what is distinctive about involuntary memory is that it is properly
speaking unconscious. Not only is it a memory one does not know s/he has, but it is a
memory one cannot seek to preserve. By contrast, voluntary memory – and it is crucial
here that Benjamin associates it with the explosion of mnemotechnics (steam printing,
photography, phonography, cinematography etc) in the 19th century – is deliberative,
conscious as a matter of principle, but for precisely that reason voluntary memory is
memory that contains no trace of the past whatsoever. In effect, voluntary memory is
the process whereby the mind is simply cluttered with souvenirs of the vanishing
present.

The political importance of this distinction becomes clear when to it are added the
modalities of experience. For, what matters, if consciousness (whether critical or not)
does indeed form on the site of a memory trace, is memory. On Benjamin’s account
what comprises the content of memory, not its mechanism (voluntary or involuntary),
but its content, is enduring experience, that is, Erfahrung, precisely what Proust re-
tapped through the medium of the tea-soaked madeleine. Now, there are two political
aspects to Proustian memory. The easiest to discern is the one that deals with the
moment of recognition, that is, the moment when Proust’s narrator not only discovers
that he has been trying too hard, but that everything around him — all social
institutions and practices — everything has been conspiring to keep this from him. This
is the moment, albeit cliché, of ideological unmasking. More difficult to discern is the
second aspect. This is the one where what stands out behind the isolation defining
every souvenir that clutters voluntary memory, is the collectivity latent within all
experience that endures. Here it is important to resist the impulse, succumbed to too
readily by Jennings et al. (the editors of Harvard University Press’s ‘Selected Writings’)
to temporalize experience, to, in effect, overlook Benjamin’s insistence upon the social
forces registered in the discourse and practice of involuntary memory. Otherwise,
when in ‘On the Concept of History’, Benjamin reanimates the figure of the
chronicler, a figure aligned in 1936 with the storyteller into whom has been dipped all
transmissible, hence enduring, experience, the light cast upon the politics of Messianic
Marxism is too faint to be picked up. Memory is, and a certain hyperbole is important
here, the locus of what is politicizable in the late capitalist, and now global, mode of
production. Indeed, memory is structured by the factions warring over not just its
contents, but the form of its contents.
Unsound Film

Let us say, for the sake of argument, that a link has now been forged between politics and memory, not a sufficient link, but a necessary one. Whereby any account of the production of critical consciousness will at some point have to confront the question of memory. Specifically, such accounts will have to struggle, like Penelope, with the warp of recollection and the woof of forgetting, in effect, with what Spivak has called the ‘text-ility’ of experience.9 Now while Benjamin, for reasons not hard to discern, concentrates on the memory that is forgetting (voluntary memory), one is not thereby entitled to ignore the forgetting that is recollection, or at the very least, repetition. Of the many instances of such forgetting — and it is important here to insist, against Nietzsche who counseled learned forgetting, upon the involuntary character of the forgetting — one that cries out for attention is that of the so called haunting melody, or put more profanely, the tune stuck in one’s head. Benjamin himself points us in this direction. He does so not by discussing the phenomenon per se, but by unpacking his discussion of the two memories through reference to a little known work of Theodor Reik’s, Surprise and the Psychoanalyst from 1929.10

In this text Reik too resists discussing the haunting melody directly. Instead, he lays out the fundamental concepts — surprise, memory, reminiscence, attention — drawn upon in his later study The Haunting Melody. Indeed, Reik’s discussion of the voluntary/involuntary distinction is centered round the concept of attention, thus revealing that a chief concern of his study is the choreography of the transference in the clinical setting. How, in other words, is the analyst to get in tune with the analysand’s process of free association? What form of attention must be paid to what the analysand says? Key here is the theme of surprise (in German, Überraschung), denoting as it does the feeling that arises when, through the distinctly open receptivity of involuntary attention, an affect or thought abruptly enters consciousness. In striking a chord with Benjamin’s discussion of Proust, but also in defining the concept crucial to Reik’s analysis of the haunting melody, surprise springs the trap door that fashions communicating vessels of Benjamin’s ‘On Some Motifs in Baudelaire’ and The Haunting Melody. Through this surprising portal questions concerning the politics of memory can be brought to bear on a specific form of forgetting that is, just the same, recollection.

Reik’s study of music has been largely ignored. In this it repeats what Reik himself characterizes as the status of music in Freud’s corpus. A notable, indeed the notable, exception here is Philippe-Lacoue-Labarthe’s remarkable chapter, ‘The Echo of the Subject’ from Typography. Concerned with the relation between autobiography and music, Lacoue-Labarthe deftly teases out the relation between Reik and Gustav Mahler, showing the depths to which autobiography is in fact propped up on the reiterated failures of others. Because he does not do much of anything with the politics of memory, it would appear that this otherwise ignored text may yet contain surprising insights.

For those unfamiliar with it a violently brief summary of its concerns is warranted. Although it is presented as a general study of psychoanalysis and music, the text orbits tightly around Reik’s own struggle with a haunting melody. Here is the scene. On Christmas day of 1925 Reik, while on vacation, was informed by a colleague that Karl
Abraham, Reik's own analyst, had died the day before and that Freud wanted Reik to give a eulogy for Abraham at the next meeting of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society. To process the shock of this news Reik promptly left his hotel and went for a walk. Predictably, as he walked he thought back to the various moments spent with his analyst and later friend. In the midst of this somber reverie, to Reik's surprise, he found himself humming a tune fragment. It was the first bars of the ethereal chorale (emerging, as it does, from an almost interminable silence) from the last movement of Mahler's Second Symphony. Thinking little of it, Reik returned to his hotel and over the ensuing days he began to work on the requested eulogy. Again to his surprise, every time he sat down to work on the eulogy, indeed every time he even so much as thought about the task, the melody would return. Reik describes it as 'following' him, even 'casting a spell on him', both characterizations which call out, do they not, for the more comprehensive term 'haunting' upon which he ultimately settled. It was in order to make sense of this 'tune stuck in his head', that Reik turned to the project of theorizing the relation between music and psychoanalysis. Why the haunting melody as such calls for this act of theorization is not a question posed, much less examined, by Reik. It is another question I too will be obliged to set aside.

Reik's basic approach lends itself well to the treatment given it by Lacoue-Labarthe, that is, by sleuthing out the Oedipal rivalry between Mahler and Hans von Bulow (Mahler's teacher and later sponsor) expressed in the chorale, Reik is able to recognize a similar thought concerning his relation to Abraham as the 'involuntary' in fact unconscious trigger of the melody. Indeed, Reik's study reads as though all haunting melodies are triggered by unconscious anxieties about professional fathers who must be killed off in order for their otherwise terminally insecure children to thrive, a proposition whose unquestioned investment in Oedipalization now leaves us all a little flat. But this is why it is important to sound the theoretical depths of the text and draw out its surprising links to Benjamin's musings on the politics of memory.

What emerges clearly from Reik's discussion is the notion that the haunting melody haunts precisely because it is involuntary. It results apparently from having heard a melody, perhaps even in a state of distraction, but certainly without committing it to memory, and then, in effect, forgetting that one has heard it. When later it is recollected, when it returns, it appears to come from nowhere, further consolidating its uncanniness by exhibiting a certain obsessive, even uncontrollable, rhythm of repetition. Less typically, although this is prominent in Reik's example, the rhythm of haunting interrupts to distract one's attention, rendering a certain kind of deliberative concentration impossible. While this quality aids in its interpretation – one can assume that what gets interrupted is relevant to the significance of what interrupts (an assumption crucial to Reik's self-analysis), it is also what exposes the distraction produced by the haunting melody to the work of 'criminalization'. Indeed, this perhaps is the hallmark of a forgetting that is a recollection. From the perspective of a certain deliberative or calculative rationalism, such forgetting is decidedly not regarded as the surprising condition of possibility for a significant cultural event, say the writing of a novel. Instead, the forgetting that returns to distract is simply criminal. It is regarded as nothing more nor less than the menacing encroachment of banality perversely diverting the flow of isolated lived moments, especially moments of concentration. Perhaps predictably, this is what makes it at once fascinating and important.
To establish the importance, indeed political importance, of the haunting melody as an involuntary memory it is necessary to appeal to the work of Michel Chion, an appeal justifying the assertion that, until recently, much of the most interesting thinking about music was taking place outside musicology. In *The Voice in Cinema* Chion re-introduces a concept developed by Pierre Shaeffer (although classically linked to Pythagoras who is said to have lectured from behind a screen), the ‘acousmêtre’, a neologism derived from the French, ‘être acousmatique’ used by Chion to designate a voice without a visible source. Elaborated as the adjective ‘acoustamic’ the term is used to designate all sounds (not only cinematic ones) lacking attribution in the visual field. For reasons that will soon become clear, it is important that Chion identifies the radio as a quintessentially acoustamic medium. What makes this relevant to the problem of the haunting melody is that the tune stuck in one’s head is significantly acoustamic, even more so than the superegoic voice which, in its tone, diction and word selection, is identifiable and to that extent visualizable. As is often said: I can just hear what my mother would say about that! The haunting melody is obviously identifiable, but who precisely is the source of its high fidelity playback? Drawn more by the pre-Oedipal than the Oedipal, Chion proposes to link the acoustamic with the mother’s voice, a voice that in necessarily passing from acoustamic to visualized (assuming the sighted infant), falls short of the profound uncanniness of the haunting melody. So how then do we, in getting at this uncanniness, amplify the importantly involuntary character of the haunting melody?

Benjamin gave us an important clue when he framed matters in terms of a tension between isolation (the experience recorded in involuntary memory) and tradition (the experience inscribed in involuntary memory). If involuntary memory contains no trace of the past, this is not because it has liberated us from it. On the contrary, it has surrendered us to a past that appears to us simply as the implacable unfolding of the present, a present in which we are isolated from the social work involved in producing and sustaining it. By contrast, what was triggered by the madeleine (or the paving stone) was Combray, not just a location, but an intricate social configuration where the labor and desire that conditioned Proust’s literary act disclosed itself to him. The aspersions cast upon ‘tradition’ in the ‘Art Work’ essay, should not deafen us to the important way it metonymizes the social bond in the Baudelaire essay, for although Benjamin appears to have had no knowledge of Saussure his analysis confirms the latter’s insight that: ‘because the sign is arbitrary it follows no law other than that of tradition, and because it is based on tradition it is arbitrary’. In thereby drawing the conventional, the social, nearer and depriving it of its uniqueness (two features of the politics of reception), without however converting into an analogue for the collective unconscious, Benjamin makes the involuntary character of memory take on a distinctly political value. It indexes the experiences that, precisely to the extent that they defy calculation, that they elude deliberation, become politicizable beyond the memorable context of the prevailing consensus. The reluctantly cultivated forms of ‘never forgetting’, in fact crowd such experiences out, but only, in the end, to intensify their aleatory power. In this sense, Proust is only one of many who carry with them the points of reference for a deep repudiation of the middle class hegemony now seeking to imagine itself as wholly global phenomenon.

To conclude, back then to the motif of criminalization. Complicating our relation to involuntary memory – a relation structurally condemned to obliquity – is its status,
perhaps even its cultural value — within Western modernity. Quite apart from the link between reason and action forged within political philosophy and covetously sheltered within the discipline of Political Science, involuntary memory, specifically as incarnated in the haunting melody, has maintained an assiduously cultivated association with both perversion and fascism. It has been officially criminalized, and, to invoke a distinction dear to penal if not juridical discourse, thereby de-politicized. While it would be presumptuous to claim that this association begins with Fritz Lang’s M (1931) it is certainly given a given a full hearing there, one that would confirm, would it not, that the encounter between sound and the cinema was just as fateful for the medium as that between the cinema and fiction (to repeat Metz’s famous observation). Granted, given the sort of persistent scholarly attention the film has received, it may seem like an exercise in futility to invoke it here, but this is no argument against the possibility that this film may still be capable of surprising us.

Consider the following lines from the concluding scene, where the trapped Hans Beckert is pleading for mercy before what has been described as a kangaroo court:

But I... I can’t help myself. I have no control over this, this evil thing inside me. The fire, the voices, the torment! [...] It’s there all the time, driving me out to wander the streets, following me, silently, but I can feel it there. It’s me, pursuing myself. I want to escape, to escape from myself! But it is impossible. I can’t escape. I have to obey it. I have to run... endless streets. And I am pursued by ghosts. Ghosts of mothers. And those children... they never leave me. They are there, always there... except when I do it. When I...15

These remarks are preceded by a distinction drawn by Beckert between himself and criminals, that is, people who, unlike him, have chosen evil. This is the significance of the ‘But I, I can’t help myself’ (or, as the German has it, ‘you can, but I must!’) with which the cited passage begins. In a film, one of whose oft-cited formal characteristics is the systematic collapse it effects between crime and law, such a gesture shifts immediately into the realm of meta-commentary. Beckert is thus giving voice to the logic of criminalization in general and for that very reason provoking the charge. Moreover, in the course of the cited passage both the subject and the object of crime undergoes a tortuous mutation, largely effected through the subtle inflections of the ‘it’ (or as Freud put it, and the neuter gender — as Blanchot was ceaselessly to remind us — is crucial, das Es). Initially associated with ‘this evil thing inside’; the ‘it’ effects a Moebian transformation becoming the outside that pursues, indeed that — like a ghost — haunts Beckert, culminating in the ‘when I do it’, the unspeakable act subject here to the figure of aposiopeis. Thus, both the fact and the cause of criminality are fateful suspended.

Of course, das Es, as Lacan later insisted, is also the letter, indeed the letter S that in his re-writing of Saussure’s algorithm assumes the position of the signifier. No doubt this powers its Moebian maneuvers. But the S is also a sibilant (from Latin, sibilare, to whistle), that is, an onomatopoeic phoneme that, in this film especially, attaches all the ‘its’, all the (E)s’s, to Beckert’s whistling, to that obsessively repeated melodic fragment from Grieg’s setting of Ibsen’s Peer Gynt. For the spectators/auditors this too is the ‘it’,

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the Es/S, that pursues, follows, haunts. In effect, it is' the haunting melody of Lang's M.

Reich, of course, would urge us to explore which involuntary memory is indexed by this melody, and, truth be told, it would not be uninteresting to think about why Grieg, why this fragment – one whose rhythmic design (at least in the score) lends itself to the acceleration that bespeaks the frenzied violence of the trolls it is scripted to convey, etc – but surely one would have to pursue this not in relation to Beckert, but in relation to Lang, who, let us recall, only the year before writing and directing M, scoffed loudly and publicly at the very concept of the sound film.

Time will not permit a full consideration of the status of whistling in the film, but in addition to the fact that it appears in many incarnations, indeed as the very trace that finally, through the agency of a blind man, attaches the S to the M, whistling turns out be something Beckert, Lohman and Shränker share.

True, Lohman and Shränker are haunted by different melodies, but it is perfectly clear that whistling is part of the intricate aural and visual interweaving deployed by the film to collapse the distinction between crime and law, an effect perfectly rendered in the persistent use of whistling to relay signals from one group to another. To that extent, it too situates every scene in which it occurs immediately at the provocative level of metacommentary. Moreover, when we consider that because Peter Lorre could not whistle – alas, he met Lauren Bacall, the consummate whistling coach, only after he came to Hollywood – Lang himself had to over-dub the whistling parts, then the full complexity of the film's texture comes into focus. In effect, Beckert's haunting melody hooks what

Figure 1. M. Dir. Fritz Lang [Germany, 1931]
Raymond Bellour in his study of Hitchcock’s signature cameo roles called “the enunciator,” onto the chain linking law and crime. As a result, the film situates the collective apparatus of enunciation that is the cinema within the frame of its meta-commentary on the it, 

"das Es", that whistles through the crack between a law that is no longer simply law, and a crime that is no longer simply crime. Chion, whose comments on M are otherwise quite penetrating, decides not to draw attention to the
provocatively acousmatic character of a whistle that even when visualized only points more insistently at the unattributable source of the apparatus itself.\textsuperscript{16}

No doubt the decisive link between the cinematic apparatus and its sound was given its consummate formulation by Adorno and Eisler when they wrote: ‘Motion picture music corresponds to the whistling or singing child in the dark’.\textsuperscript{17} Like Freud who associated this precise situation with \textit{Angst}, or anxiety, they stressed that the child’s fear was not directed outward toward the screen, but inward toward what Eisler and Adorno call the child’s ‘muteness’, the traumatic folding of its own voice. This predicament is figured with an arresting richness in the scene illustrated by the following still:

Here, precisely in protesting the silence imposed upon him by the police, Beckert turns to the press. He does so while whistling the Grieg melody, thereby consolidating its status as a haunting melody and not simply a motif employed as a stalking device.\textsuperscript{18} Moreover, he presses his case while writing a message that ends with the enigmatic signifier ‘En’ (the first syllable of \textit{Ende}) but here broken off by shadow to leave what ... ‘Es’? As the graphologist consulted later explains, ‘the broken letters reveal the
personality of an actor', Lorre, of course, but also anyone whose speech is prompted or otherwise displaced by the words of others. And remember, Lorre cannot whistle. Thus, the haunting whistle in M, after all Lang's first sound film, might be said to bespeak a rather particular involuntary memory, that is, the onset of a general muting wrought, paradoxically, by the coming of sound. If Heinz Pohle (in Der Rundfunk als Instrument der Politik) is right about the role of radio in Germany during the 20s and 30s – he argues that with the establishment of Deutsche Rundfunk radio broadcasts quite literally saturated every aspect of urban space throughout the country (the Ur-boom box?) – then, the coming of sound happened both inside and outside the cinema, indeed, the coming of sound to the German cinema was preceded by a deafening din.

M confronts us with this vividly when for much screen time it is precisely this din that has been uncannily silenced. Think here of the many urban scenes where traffic, largely manifested in car horns, only intermittently breaks through the dead air of the soundtrack. Is this inversion – the big city reduced to an anechoic chamber where precisely what is missing is the hustle and bustle of the socius – is this inversion the content, what Benjamin would call the Erfahrung, of the involuntary memory inscribed in Beckert's serial whistle? Is the haunting melody then the inscription of experience that endures, not simply because it is part of tradition, but because where it comes from has arbitrarily been cast as that which tradition must now drown out? If so, is Lang not then pricking our ears, leaving us with the sounds of what fades when attentive listening, especially to, not the political, but politics, becomes the order of the day? And, as a final rhetorical salvo, is M – and the heteronymic ambiguity is deliberate (the murderer/the film) – in a strict sense a criminal of the political?
As tempting as it may be to say 'yes' immediately to such questions, prudence is warranted. Precisely because it leaves the terms of penal discourse intact the romance of de-criminalization is its own ruse and, after all, articulating the politicizable leaves the work of the political undone. Thus a cautionary tale may be the fitting way to end. In 'The Name of a Dog, or Natural Rights' Levinas tells us the story of Bobby. Bobby was a stray dog that befriended Levinas and others when they were held at a forced labor camp shortly after the onset of WW II. As Jews the prisoners were, from the point of view of their captors and the local townspeople, not human beings. They lived this inhumanity in the most intimate way. What made Bobby – a name given to the dog by Levinas – matter is that he barked. He wooed. In doing so, he re-humanized the prisoners, delivering them from what had so completely ethered them. Levinas's gratitude to Bobby (the definitive Fido) causes the page on which it is expressed to tremble. So the obvious inverted question must be: what did Bobby make of the whistle that hailed him? Or, to end on a less warped note, what precisely are we to make of the whistling that strikes out everywhere toward that dark forgetting we imagine Bobby to be approaching us from? Who or what are we calling to come?

Notes

4 Slavoj Žižek, 'Today Iraq, Tomorrow... Democracy?', In These Times, March 18th, 2003, http://www.inthesetimes.com/site/main/article/3657/
10 It must also be stressed here that a glaring silence in Benjamin's discussion of Proust, one that, were it filled in, might have preempted even pre-dicted Riek's study, is his lack of interest in the fragment from the Venteuil Sonata. This fragment haunts Proust's text in general and its mediation on the interweaving of reading and writing in particular. It does so in a way that brings the apparatus of the book and the politics of memory together in rather suggestive fashion.
12 This term, no doubt more familiar to us in its prefixed form, 'de-criminalization', largely derives from the legal discourse that has grown up around the "war on drugs." It points to a logic—whereby drugs promote criminal activity if and only if their use has been criminalized—that has been more carefully delineated in Jacques Derrida's, The Force of Law. In particular, Derrida draws out the relation of supplementation that binds law and force, reminding us that criminalization first proceeds by violently separating crime from law, and then authorizing the latter to police both crime and the law/crime relation. Thus, what is criminal is so not "in itself," but only insofar as it helps discriminate the criminal and the lawful, a discrimination that must itself be neither law nor crime. In this sense criminalization is entirely about foreclosure. What makes the law lawful simply goes without saying.
those buried in the extra-diegetic space of the film, notably all those docile bodies huddled together in the film auditorium.


18 It is worth stressing that this scene also brings out in its purest form the pattern whereby when we hear the whistling of Greg's theme, we do not see Beckert's face. Here, the camera is positioned over his left ear and while our ears fill with the whistle, the back of Beckert's head conspicuously fills the portion of the screen not given over to the text of his message. As Chion has pointed out, this concretizes the acoustic character of the whistling, although he does not tease out what might be said about the directorial supplement at work here. Perhaps the most intriguing confirmation of this general pattern is contained in the one episode of failed stalking. Here, we actually do see Beckert packing as though whistling. Does this not suggest that when the whistle is no longer acoustic, its menace loses its sting, thereby fusing its threat to its disappearance from the visual field.

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The treatment of afebrile subarachnoid hemorrhage in the non-surgical patient. The article was originally presented as a paper at the Student Con...

1. Systemic Hemorrhage

2. Cerebral Pathology

Cerebral venous sinus thrombosis, also known as cerebral sinus thrombosis, is a serious medical condition that can lead to strokes and other complications. It occurs when the veins in the brain become blocked, which can cause a lack of oxygen to the brain tissue. The condition is often caused by blood clots or infections, and can be treated with anticoagulant medications, surgery, or other interventions. It is important to identify and treat cerebral venous sinus thrombosis as soon as possible to minimize the risk of permanent damage to the brain.
coining methods for the dream.

The two types of analysis (one global, the other fragmentary)
authority reads the things written between the notions of anxiety and
cannot access the special reserve. The combination of these
in the stress sequence of my specific setting, the meaning of the
ideological situation:

We never hope to show that in sport and culture, can have a high
various aspects of my present interpretation of the dream, which
who could feel that anymore from the patient's
your problem and multicenter was to return to a more
reconstruction of the notion of dreams are, in other words,
A conscious model of the blue angel: dare in the wake of
and second as conscious einbettung; hence
the process of order and unity, and in the dream's construction
we are aware of the fact, and the/it of the
and so on; the physiological situation of the "blue angel"
functions in this as when Freud calls the "symbolic" and the "de-

The best of these procedures considers the content of the dream

In conclusion, the notion of a certain sound with a certain
The idea of the yellow house, that is, an illusion to consider a
II. Nonverbal, 'characterless', ideological statements

proposes a number of statements: they directly enter a
In some transient, these readings, symbolic, and
decoding, and
II. Nonverbal, 'characterless', ideological statements

method: the relational aspect is in both cases equally poor.

we are aware of the fact, and the/it of the
meanings in accordance with a kind, a kind,

This is a study how can be expressed in another way: having a
method, since it is defined as a thing of culture in which
metaphors that are languages, and are not metaphorically
that is, the two methods of
just be decoded into the

The best of these procedures considers the content of the dream

The永恒的 Goldman (1947). The association of this name the

in the base of the problem, and the dream, and the dream

The best of these procedures considers the content of the dream


decoding, and

methods

local and non-specific codes
The police and the public are entitled to the confidence of the community that their actions are fair and impartial. The police must be seen to be fair and impartial, not only in their actions but also in their attitudes and behavior.

(a) The police are entitled to the confidence of the community because they are seen to be fair and impartial. The police must be seen to be fair and impartial, not only in their actions but also in their attitudes and behavior.

(b) The police are entitled to the confidence of the community because they are seen to be fair and impartial. The police must be seen to be fair and impartial, not only in their actions but also in their attitudes and behavior.

(c) The police are entitled to the confidence of the community because they are seen to be fair and impartial. The police must be seen to be fair and impartial, not only in their actions but also in their attitudes and behavior.

(d) The police are entitled to the confidence of the community because they are seen to be fair and impartial. The police must be seen to be fair and impartial, not only in their actions but also in their attitudes and behavior.

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(f) The police are entitled to the confidence of the community because they are seen to be fair and impartial. The police must be seen to be fair and impartial, not only in their actions but also in their attitudes and behavior.

(g) The police are entitled to the confidence of the community because they are seen to be fair and impartial. The police must be seen to be fair and impartial, not only in their actions but also in their attitudes and behavior.

(h) The police are entitled to the confidence of the community because they are seen to be fair and impartial. The police must be seen to be fair and impartial, not only in their actions but also in their attitudes and behavior.

(i) The police are entitled to the confidence of the community because they are seen to be fair and impartial. The police must be seen to be fair and impartial, not only in their actions but also in their attitudes and behavior.

(j) The police are entitled to the confidence of the community because they are seen to be fair and impartial. The police must be seen to be fair and impartial, not only in their actions but also in their attitudes and behavior.

(k) The police are entitled to the confidence of the community because they are seen to be fair and impartial. The police must be seen to be fair and impartial, not only in their actions but also in their attitudes and behavior.

(l) The police are entitled to the confidence of the community because they are seen to be fair and impartial. The police must be seen to be fair and impartial, not only in their actions but also in their attitudes and behavior.

(m) The police are entitled to the confidence of the community because they are seen to be fair and impartial. The police must be seen to be fair and impartial, not only in their actions but also in their attitudes and behavior.

(n) The police are entitled to the confidence of the community because they are seen to be fair and impartial. The police must be seen to be fair and impartial, not only in their actions but also in their attitudes and behavior.

(o) The police are entitled to the confidence of the community because they are seen to be fair and impartial. The police must be seen to be fair and impartial, not only in their actions but also in their attitudes and behavior.

(p) The police are entitled to the confidence of the community because they are seen to be fair and impartial. The police must be seen to be fair and impartial, not only in their actions but also in their attitudes and behavior.

(q) The police are entitled to the confidence of the community because they are seen to be fair and impartial. The police must be seen to be fair and impartial, not only in their actions but also in their attitudes and behavior.

(r) The police are entitled to the confidence of the community because they are seen to be fair and impartial. The police must be seen to be fair and impartial, not only in their actions but also in their attitudes and behavior.

(s) The police are entitled to the confidence of the community because they are seen to be fair and impartial. The police must be seen to be fair and impartial, not only in their actions but also in their attitudes and behavior.

(t) The police are entitled to the confidence of the community because they are seen to be fair and impartial. The police must be seen to be fair and impartial, not only in their actions but also in their attitudes and behavior.

(u) The police are entitled to the confidence of the community because they are seen to be fair and impartial. The police must be seen to be fair and impartial, not only in their actions but also in their attitudes and behavior.

(v) The police are entitled to the confidence of the community because they are seen to be fair and impartial. The police must be seen to be fair and impartial, not only in their actions but also in their attitudes and behavior.

(w) The police are entitled to the confidence of the community because they are seen to be fair and impartial. The police must be seen to be fair and impartial, not only in their actions but also in their attitudes and behavior.

(x) The police are entitled to the confidence of the community because they are seen to be fair and impartial. The police must be seen to be fair and impartial, not only in their actions but also in their attitudes and behavior.

(y) The police are entitled to the confidence of the community because they are seen to be fair and impartial. The police must be seen to be fair and impartial, not only in their actions but also in their attitudes and behavior.

(z) The police are entitled to the confidence of the community because they are seen to be fair and impartial. The police must be seen to be fair and impartial, not only in their actions but also in their attitudes and behavior.
The implications of dreams can be far-reaching and profound. In the business world, the interpretation of dreams can provide insights into the unique needs and desires of individuals. It is important to understand the potential value of dreaming and its ability to offer solutions to various problems.

In this context, the examination of dreams is of utmost importance. Dreams are not just random occurrences; they are a form of communication between the conscious and subconscious mind.

The process of interpreting dreams involves several steps:

1. **Identifying the Main Themes**
   - What are the dominant elements in the dream? What do they represent?

2. **Interpreting the Symbols**
   - What do the symbols in the dream signify? Are there any specific meanings associated with them?

3. **Exploring the Emotional Tone**
   - How do the emotions expressed in the dream affect the interpretation?

4. **Considering the Personal Context**
   - How does the dream relate to the individual's current situation or personal experiences?

5. **Synthesizing the Insights**
   - How can the insights gained from the dream be applied to real-life situations?

By following these steps, one can gain a deeper understanding of the significance of dreams and their potential to influence conscious thought.

In conclusion, the art of dream interpretation is not just a form of entertainment; it is a powerful tool for personal growth and self-discovery. Dreams are a unique window into the subconscious mind, offering a glimpse into the hidden aspects of the self. By leveraging the power of dreams, one can unlock new perspectives and insights into one's own psyche and the world around them.
Introduction

purpose of comparison:

I will start by repeating my own essay on the formal analysis of the narrative, my criticism of the screenwriter's treatment of their material, and the emphasis on the effectiveness of the performance, the physical action, and the psychological tension. I will contrast this with more recent work that has concentrated on the director's role and the influence of the performers. I will then consider the impact of the material on the audience.

Nicholas Camburn

in the formal analysis of film

Reply to Thirty Wonders, The Treatment of Ideas, by

Edited and translated by Claudia Gorbman

Michel Chion

THE VOICE IN CINEMA
A PRIMAL NICE AND SEE
HUMAN VISION is like that of camera, is partial and

eill your vision. Because the image is partial and

EVEN THEORETICAL KNOWLEDGE is unconfined. We cannot see

10000.0

one, the acoustome
potentially the voice. Critics often cite an early scene in the first film where the protagonist, a man who has been brought to the moon, interacts with a group of scientists. This scene is significant as it sets the stage for the conflict that follows.

In the second film, the protagonist returns to the moon and confronts the scientists. However, the voice of the protagonist is noticeably absent, as if he is not really there. This absence is significant because it suggests that the dialogue is being performed by someone else, possibly an actor or a voice actor. The text does not provide any information about who is performing the voice, but it is clear that the voice is not the protagonist's original voice.

Overall, the text highlights the importance of the voice in the film, and the significance of its absence in the second film. The voice is a crucial element in the film, and its absence in the second film raises questions about the nature of the protagonist's identity and agency.
The audience is an integral part of the performance. The actors interact with the audience, inviting them to participate in the play. This interaction is crucial for the success of the performance, as it allows the audience to feel more connected to the story and the characters. The actors employ various techniques, such as direct address and physical movement, to engage the audience. The audience responds by following the performance, offering applause, laughter, or gasps of surprise. This dynamic between the actors and the audience creates a lively and engaging atmosphere, which enhances the overall theatrical experience. The actors' ability to read and gauge the audience's reactions helps them to adjust their performance accordingly, ensuring that the audience remains captivated throughout the show.
The phenomenon of the accommodation is vital to our understanding of how our visual system works. The accommodation process is triggered by the brain when we focus on objects that are not within our normal range of vision. This process is crucial for maintaining clear vision, as it allows the eye to adjust the shape of the lens to focus on different distances.

The accommodation process is controlled by the ciliary muscles, which are located behind the lens. When these muscles contract, the lens becomes more spherical, allowing it to focus on objects that are closer to the eye. Conversely, when the muscles relax, the lens flattens, enabling it to focus on distant objects.

The accommodation process is a complex interplay between neural and muscular systems, and it is essential for our ability to see clearly at various distances. Without this process, our vision would be limited to a narrow range of focus, and we would be unable to see objects that are either too close or too far away.

In conclusion, the accommodation process is a vital aspect of our visual system, allowing us to see clearly at various distances. Understanding how it works can help us appreciate the incredible complexity of our visual system and the remarkable abilities it confers upon us.
The camera's eye is the eye of the audience, not the eye of the director. The director may have a different vision of how a scene is meant to be shot, but the audience sees it through the lens of the camera. When the director gives instructions, it's about creating a specific mood or atmosphere, not necessarily following the script word-for-word.

A good number of films are based on the idea of the audience feeling something, not just seeing it. The camera is there to capture the emotion, not just the action. It's about making the audience feel like they're part of the story, not just watching it from the sidelines.

In summary, the camera is a tool for storytelling, and it's up to the director to use it effectively. By understanding the role of the camera, we can better appreciate the artistry and craft that goes into filmmaking.
The most disconcerting in this, is when we interact with others.

ERST AND VISION, whose limbs are not known.
more disturbing is the idea of God or Being with only partial power to link and intersect works of our reason and material, which of a God who sees all the gods, and knows all the gods of Judas, Christ’s Trinity, they who think whose dimensions we do not know. The idea of knowledge, however, whose dimensions are not known, and of the power of knowing, whose dimensions are not known.

The soundtrack: no just a mere unfamiliarity by speaking...

undertakers everywhere.

If the concept can rise for the subject who no longer occupies the
mind then the "overwrought" is no mere error or consequence;
and was elaborated (a leap in which the voice was elaborated) into
the first moments of the concept, the difference of a whole of
which all bodies in a voice, markers because the voice, without
any conceptual, conceptual. "Conceptual power, and so on.

Because of the difficulties, conceptual power, whose

frame: conceptual power, whose dimensions, and if you are familiar with the concept, the power of
which is not known, and of the voice, whose dimensions are not known.

We cannot afford to have, and know only what is in our power to think, which

in which, it is known, the only thing is known, and nothing is known.

In which, it is known, the only thing is known, and nothing is known.
The voice is the first, the last, the most important element of the performance. When the voice is strong, the message is clear. When the voice is weak, the message is lost. The voice is the bridge between the performer and the audience. It is the medium through which the performer's ideas and emotions are conveyed. The voice is the conductor of the orchestra of the mind. It is the wind that moves the sails of the imagination. It is the fire that ignites the passions. It is the light that guides the way. The voice is the heart of the performance, the soul of the art. It is the voice that makes the music.